The limits of the possible: shaping the learning and skills landscape through a shared policy narrative by Keep, Ewart John
   
ISSN 1466-1535 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The limits of the possible: shaping the learning and 
skills landscape through a shared policy narrative 
 
SKOPE Research Paper No. 86  June  2009 
 
Ewart Keep 
 
 
SKOPE, School of Social Sciences 
Cardiff University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESRC funded Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance 
Cardiff and Oxford Universities 
   
   
Editor’s Foreword 
SKOPE Publications  
This series publishes the work of the members and associates of SKOPE.  A formal 
editorial process ensures that standards of quality and objectivity are maintained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Orders for publications should be addressed to the SKOPE Secretary, 
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Glamorgan Building, 
King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3WT 
 
Research papers can be downloaded from the website: 
www.skope.ox.ac.uk 
   
   1 
If the decision is going to be made by the facts, then everyone’s facts, 
as long as they are relevant, are equal.  If the decision is going to be 
made on the basis of people’s opinions, then mine count for a lot more. 
(James Barksdale, CEO of Netscape, quoted in Pfeffer and Sutton, 
2006: 74) 
Introduction 
This paper seeks to map the key concepts, images and theoretical bases of the policy 
story that surrounds education and training policy in England, and to expose the 
implicit and explicit assumptions that drive the policy discourse(s) on skills.  To put it 
another way, the aim is to explore how the stories that underlie policy serve to 
structure the geography of the ‘land of the possible’ wherein policy makers come to 
determine and then promulgate what they can and cannot seek to do in this field.  In 
attempting this, the paper will also address one of the key policy technologies 
whereby the state (in the shape of national politicians, civil servants and senior staff in 
government agencies) attempts to maintain control of policy debate and resultant 
activity in this field – the development and maintenance of a shared explanatory 
narrative to underpin strategic policy development and resultant interventions. 
This mapping exercise is primarily concerned with the post-compulsory and 
adult phases of learning and with the more vocational end of the learning spectrum, 
rather than with the traditional heartland of education policy (children, classrooms, 
teachers, and schools and universities).  In English ‘machinery of government’ terms, 
it is thus more to do with the Learning and Skills sector, the Learning and Skills 
Council (LSC) (and in future the Skills Funding Agency (SFA)) and further education 
(FE) and private training providers.  This is because schools, higher education (HE) 
and traditional ‘academic’ learning have tended to be governed by a slightly different, 
albeit increasingly overlapping set of assumptions and priorities (for an excellent 
examination of the story on schools see Ball, 2008).  This point notwithstanding, with 
the political capital being sunk into the new 14-19 Diplomas and the coming of the 
Leitch agenda and its stress on the role of HE and Level 4 skills, a growing 
integration of the narrative being examined here into the thinking underpinning policy 
on schools and universities seems a possible outcome. 
It is also important to be clear what this paper is not trying to do.  It does not 
pretend to offer a model for the entire education and training policy process, nor 
provide an analysis of the nature of the (extended) state. 
   2 
The Key Theories, Concepts, Ideologies and Images that Underlie Policy 
The section that follows tries to identify the main strands of thought and theory that 
have underpinned the basic assumptions that have guided policymakers when 
contemplating what lines of policy development are open to them and might be 
desirable to follow.  An important point to make at the outset is that the picture 
presented here is one made at a certain point in time, and essentially reports the results 
of the gradual accretion of layer upon layer of policy statements and of a sequence of 
iterations and re- iterations of policy thinking over a 30-year period that is broadly 
akin to the process through which sedimentary rock is laid down.  As will be 
discussed below, this incremental evolution and repetition has served to create a 
framework of thought wherein one element reinforces the next and where reference 
back to early statements of the same idea or policy are seen to imbue the latest version 
with a form of canonical status.  In other words, what is examined below did not 
arrive as a full-blown body of thought and theory – it developed quite slowly and 
sometimes haltingly, though with an underlying general trend that, at each successive 
stage, the claims being made for the economic (and more latterly social) role of skills 
were increased.  There is no attempt to chart the historical evolution of this body of 
thought.  That would be a different, and quite massive task.  The aim here is to 
describe and analyse it as it currently stands. 
The analysis that follows draws upon a range of policy documents – the most 
important of which are: 
· DfEE, 1998 
· LSC, 2001 
· H M Treasury, 2002 
· DfES/HMT/DTI/DWP, 2003 
· DfES/DTI/HMT/DWP, 2005 
· DfES, 2004 
· LSC, 2005 
· DfES, 2006 
· Leitch Review, 2005 & 2006 
· DIUS, 2007. 
with, in addition, speeches given by Prime Ministers Blair (2007) and Brown (2007a; 
2007b), a range of documentation from bodies such as the Learning and Skills 
Council (LSC), the UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES), the Sector 
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Skills Development Agency (SSDA) and a host of other government quangos.  It also 
draws upon the author’s experience of the skills debate as it has been conducted over 
the last quarter of a century or more, and of sitting in on various policy deliberations 
being conducted by bodies such as H. M. Treasury, the Manpower Services 
Commission (MSC), the National Skills Task Force (NSTF), the Department for 
Education and Employment (DfEE), the Department for Education and Skills (DfES), 
the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS), the SSDA, the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI), the Cabinet Office and the LSC. 
As this list suggests, the narrative is not the work of a single government 
department – it encompasses elements contributed or embellished by all the above 
named bodies, as well as by individual politicians, their advisors, senior civil servants 
and quango managers, and a variety of policy entrepreneurs (as Ball (2008) terms 
them), such as Charles Leadbeater.  However, its central guardian and evangelist has 
tended to be the government department with prime responsibility for skills issues – 
DfEE, then DfES and now DIUS. 
This narrative covers the nature of the ‘skills problem/crisis’, its causes, and 
the range of policy interventions that can potentially be deployed to meet it.  This 
narrative was first constructed in its present form by central government policy 
makers during the 1980s and its fundamental principles have not shifted since then, 
though the nuances of the story have altered and the tale has been considerably 
elaborated as it has passed from teller to teller.  In historical terms, its equivalent 
might be taken to be the party ‘line’ within Communist governments and parties - an 
all-encompassing story that determines what can and cannot be contemplated and 
discussed.  In other words, as will be discussed at greater length below, the narrative 
delineates the borders of the possible (in policy terms), and, equally importantly, what 
is not ‘available for discussion’ (a phrase sometimes deployed by English civil 
servants to warn people off topics that are either deemed subversive, or where 
ministers have already decided on a particular line of action and where there is 
therefore no point whatsoever in any further debate). 
The Major Elements of the Current Narrative 
The narrative has centred around the following key elements: 
· Globalisation is an unstoppable force, and is creating worldwide product, 
capital and labour markets, wherein the UK and its individual 
citizens/workers must compete (HMT/DfEE/DWP/DTI, 2004; Blair, 2007; 
   4 
Brown, 2007a).  The chief means of adjusting to these challenges is to 
invest in the human capital of the workforce, since it is assumed that this 
confers competitive advantages (to nations, enterprises and individuals) 
that are hard to imitate.  This reading of human capital theory has been 
derived from a policy-oriented economics literature (for example, Reich, 
1983; and  Thurow, 1995).  This body of work assumes that when it comes 
to skills, more is better as skill is the key to economic success, particularly 
in a modern, supposedly knowledge-driven global economy where other 
elements of production can be geographically relocated or are open to 
imitation.  More and better skills are thus, ‘the most important lever within 
our control to create wealth and to reduce social deprivation’ (Leitch 
Review, 2006:2), with human capital now, ‘the key determinant of 
corporate and country success’ (Blair, 2007:2). 
· As a result, skills are one of the few areas where, within a generally de-
regulationist and laissez-faire approach to economic policy, government 
can or should seek to intervene (though not in terms of prescribing what 
employers should do).  In many instances, the need for government 
interventions is justified via the problem of market failure and the 
poaching of skilled labour (see Keep, 2006a). 
· Given globalisation and heightened international competition, a critical 
importance is assigned to international benchmarking of stocks of skills (as 
proxied by qualifications held by the national population/workforce) – see 
Keep, 2008.  These comparisons have been deployed in order to create a 
sense of ‘moral panic’ about our relative performance on skill, leverage the 
case for greater public investment in education and training, and press the 
need for England/the UK to stockpile more skills/qualifications in order to 
‘catch up’ with overseas rivals, much in the manner of a turn of the 
twentieth century battleship building race (Keep and Mayhew, 2004), or a 
post-WW2 nuclear arms race (see Brown et al, 2008).  In other words, 
benchmarking provides the basis for the creation of a sense of national 
crisis (see HMT/DfES/DWP/DTI, 2004; the Le itch Review 2005 & 2006; 
and DfES, 2007 for details thereof).  For an excellent early example of this 
type of benchmarking in support of policy development readers are 
directed to Competence and Competition (1984), and for the latest (and 
somewhat less ana lytically robust) version to the Leitch Review of Skills 
(2005 & 2006).  For further reflections on this topic, see Keep, 2008.  The 
import and policy prescriptions attached to these global benchmarking 
exercises may well be deeply flawed (see Brown et al, 2008). 
· De-regulated, flexible labour markets deliver the best economic results 
(Blair, 2007; Brown, 2007a).  Therefore, training should be organised on a 
largely voluntary basis, with minimal prescription and regulation of what 
employers should be expected to provide. The main safeguards for 
workers in terms of preventing exploitation within the workplace are 
twofold.  First, via a minimum platform of universal individual 
employment rights (for example, on health & safety; entitlement to paid 
holidays, maternity and paternity leave).  This platform is now in place, 
and no further major extensions are anticipated.  Second, as Blair outlines 
(2007), if people feel they are being poorly treated or undervalued in their 
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current workplace, their skills will enable them to find better employment 
elsewhere. 
· In terms of an underlying philosophy of how the labour market and the 
employment relationship function, the stance is unitarist rather than 
pluralist in perspective – fundamental material differences between 
workers and managers do not need to exist and, ‘the best business works 
today as a partnership’ (Blair, 2007:6).  Conflict between workers, and 
capital and management is ultimately futile, since change (the need for 
which is identified by management) cannot be averted.  The role for 
collective action is therefore limited, because the human capital that is 
being traded in a series of individual employee/employer bargains and 
relationships is held by individuals, not the collective.  Bargaining power 
hence rests with each worker, not with any collective manifestation or 
expression of worker power.  The role of unions, insofar as they have a 
role (they receive just four brief mentions in the Leitch Review Final 
Report, 2006), is, ‘to work in partnership with employers to ensure 
profitable companies that take care of their staff’ (Blair, 2007:5), and to 
supply services to members, of which help with upskilling and re-skilling 
is one. 
· In terms of the changing structure of the labour market, the dominant 
strand in the narrative has been a belief in the impending impact of 
cataclysmic and immutable shifts in the nature of paid work – the end of 
careers, portfolio working, and, most importantly, the rise of the 
knowledge driven economy and knowledge workers. The bulk of the 
labour force either are, or will become, knowledge workers, or as Tony 
Blair put it, ‘in a sense, a whole economy has passed away…  In the new 
knowledge economy, human capital, the skills people possess, is critical’ 
(Blair, 2007:3).  The economy of the future will require far more highly 
skilled employees than now (Leitch, 2005 & 2006; Blair, 2007: 2; Brown, 
2007a).  The persistence of the bottom end of the labour market and of 
monotonous, low paid, dead-end work has generally either been ignored, 
or it has been assumed can be tackled by upskilling the workers who fill 
these positions (see DCSF/DIUS, 2007; LSC, 2007), though who would 
then occupy these jobs is never vouchsafed. 
· A belief that increasing wage inequality is the result of skill-biased 
technical change rather than, for example, the decline of collective 
bargaining (Leitch Review, 2005). 
· Because of the foregoing assumptions, both economic performance AND 
social justice and mobility can best be served through improvements in the 
skill levels of individual workers (DIUS, 2007).  As the Leitch Review’s 
Final Report declared, ‘Our nation’s skills are not world class and we run 
the risk that this will undermine the UK’s long-term prosperity.  
Productivity continues to trail many of our main international comparators.  
Despite recent progress, the UK has serious social disparities with high 
levels of child poverty, poor employment rates for the disadvantaged, 
regional disparities and relatively high income inequality.  Improving our 
skill levels can address all these problems’ (2006: 1).  This elision of 
individual and collective wellbeing (Ball, 2008: 17) has been one of the 
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main innovations injected into the narrative as it has evolved under New 
Labour. 
· Skills supply, not demand, has been deemed to be the central problem.  If 
more skills are supplied, they will automatically be used and productivity 
and economic competitiveness thereby enhanced because supply is 
assumed (in a form of Say’s Law) to create its own demand (what the 
Treasury term a ‘supply-push’ effect, HMT, 2001).  Grubb and Ryan dub 
this belief a ‘build and they will come’ myth (Grubb and Ryan, 1999). 
· The firm is best treated as a black box into which inputs – such as 
enhanced skills and a better educated workforce - are injected and from 
which will automatically emerge enhanced economic outcomes – greater 
productivity or higher value added goods and services.  Policy makers do 
not need to know about what happens within the box (and hence the 
productive process) and it has normally been deemed illegitimate for 
policy to try to intervene within this ‘sealed unit’, as this is best left to 
management acting rationally in response to the invisible hand of market 
forces (which in this case are assumed not subject to market failure). 
· Learning is a uniform and uncomplicated process that can easily be 
managed through a simple input/output model.  The importance of this 
assumption that learning is a simple activity cannot be over-stated.  As one 
informant – a member of the national LSC’s Council – noted in 
discussions with the author, since its inception, the national LSC council 
has never conducted any full discussion of what learning meant or how it 
might best be achieved (see Coffield, 2008 on the implications of this 
assumption and the need for it to change). 
· The over-riding goal of publicly-funded education and training is to further 
economic aims and to boost competitiveness.  Learning that seeks to 
satisfy other, non-vocational needs is of much lesser importance, and can 
expect to receive only very limited public support – as Coffield notes, 
what the LSC terms ‘learning for personal fulfilment, civic participation 
and community development’ now accounts for a tiny fraction of the 
LSC’s overall budget (Coffield, 2008: 49). 
Secondary Elements 
Below these primary assumptions, the narrative has embraced a set of subsidiary, but 
important, secondary beliefs that relate to the style and manner in which the learning 
and skills sector should best be designed and managed: 
· The centre (in the shape of ministers and central government departments) 
know bests, in nearly all circumstances and at nearly all times.  It therefore 
follows that strategic policy formation is and should be the sole preserve of 
ministers, advisors and senior civil servants – even within a system that at 
a rhetorical level is said to be evidence-based, employer- led and student-
centred.  At the same time, micro-management from the centre has been 
judged to be both possible and desirable.  For instance, as Coffield 
demonstrates (2008: 44-46), the LSC’s activities are currently governed by 
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seven priorities and no less than 86 goals or targets, some of which 
themselves break down into a further tier of subordinate targets. 
· Power relationships are best managed in a top-down, command and 
control manner.  Targets, set without meaningful consultation by the 
centre, are the most appropriate way of driving the system, with the Leitch 
targets forming the latest example.  It should be noted that the central 
importance attached by policy makers to management by target has a 
profound impact on what can and cannot be funded by government 
(whatever it is has to be measurable and that normally means achievement 
of a whole qualification) and what constitutes ‘training’ in the eyes of 
policy makers. 
· Following on from the above, qualifications are a good and sufficient 
proxy for skills and therefore an ideal key performance indicator for the 
education and training system, even though research indicates that the vast 
bulk of skill formation in work is uncertified and there exists no system of 
certification for the bulk of generic skills. 
· Trust is a one-way street.  Those at lower levels in the system must trust 
their superiors.  Those in charge of the system, on the other hand, normally 
cannot trust those at lower levels. 
· Multi- layer planning mechanisms, based around a simple matching model, 
can and will ensure that the supply of skill meets demand – implicitly both 
from employers and individuals, even though these are known to often be 
in conflict.  Despite a great deal of talk about a ‘demand-led’ system and 
an end to planning (DIUS, 2007), in reality (Hodgson & Spours, 2008) the 
likelihood is that planning will persist no matter what institutional 
configuration funds post-19 learning.  It is unclear what practical impact 
this planning activity has upon the education and training activities 
actually delivered. 
· FE colleges and their staff (and to a less obvious extent private training 
providers) are deemed to be habitually unresponsive to their customers 
(however defined) and continually in need of prodding, incentivising, 
berating, threatening and performance managing in detail in order to make 
them more responsive. 
· The importance attached to the desirability of marketisation and 
contestability in learning and skills provision has waxed and waned (Youth 
Credits were an early and disastrous foray into this field), but currently 
seems to be on an upward curve, with the opening up of almost the LSC’s 
entire £3 billion post-19 budget via Train to Gain and Skills Accounts. 
· Insofar as policy is ever acknowledged to fail, it does so because of 
failures of implementation and project management, not because of 
fundamental design flaws (Keep, 2006b). 
It will be apparent that these secondary beliefs allow the narrative to encode a 
set of norms about how power relationships are structured within the system.  The 
command and control nature of the relationship between the DCSF and DIUS and 
their subordinate bodies is often masked and softened by the deployment of a rhetoric 
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of partnership (Keep, 2006a), though as Coffield et al observe it is ‘partnership of a 
particular kind’ (2005: 643).  As one respondent in their research argued, ‘I wouldn’t 
pretend it was a partnership of equals: it’s very much a parent-child relationship.  You 
know: “We want you to do this.  We want you to do it in this way.  Just go and do it”’ 
(2005: 643).  This point will be enlarged upon below. 
The narrative thus sets the broad parameters for relationships between the 
centre and subordinate agencies and actors.  It does not pretend to rule out or seek to 
control the potential for overt or covert inter-agency rivalry or conflict.  Nor is 
primarily focused on trying to concert the detailed implementation of policy or the 
practice of delivery agents.  It encodes a set of basic beliefs that justify and support 
the continuity of the broad overall direction of strategy, and as such is but one weapon 
within a broader armoury of central control over the education and training system. 
It should also be noted that many of the primary and secondary assumptions 
outlined above are either weakly supported by the evidence available, or are at a 
degree of variance with reality as it is reported to exist by the extant body of scholarly 
research.  This has also proved to be a much smaller stumbling block to policy 
formation and promulgation than might perhaps have been expected, an issue which 
will also be expanded upon in what follows. 
Missing Elements 
As ever, at least as important as what is included in the narrative are those elements 
that have explicitly been excluded from it. The narrative has refused, to a greater or 
lesser degree, to cover or engage with a whole range of issues that research reveals are 
important to any meaningful understanding of how vocational learning operates and 
what motivates the various actors within any national education and training system.  
The following, for example, are more or less wholly absent: 
· The use by individuals of the outcomes of education and training as 
positional goods in support of their efforts to secure a finite (at any given 
moment) supply of ‘good’ jobs, and thus a desire on the part of some 
actors to limit the supply of high quality education and training (Brown, 
2003). 
· The role of employers as providers of education and training and as 
consumers of the system’s outputs. 
· The dangers of ‘welfare dependency’ in an education and training system 
where government increasingly intervenes to pay for things that employers 
are reluctant or choose not to fund (Keep, 2006a). 
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· Many aspects of institutional arrangements in other countries (even within 
the UK) – e.g. social partnership, devolution of power to elected local 
authorities, etc. 
· The importance of product market strategy in determining the demand for 
skills and how they are used (Ashton & Sung, 2006; Keep, Mayhew & 
Payne, 2006). 
· The importance of work organisation, job design and labour process and 
industrial relations/people management systems in determining what skills 
are needed and how effectively they are deployed within the produc tive 
process (Ashton & Sung, 2006; Keep, Mayhew & Payne, 2006). 
· Management theory about the diversity of competitive models available to 
firms (see Storey & Salaman, 2008). 
· Theory and research on the political economy of skill. 
· Theory and research about how learning takes place (Coffield, 2008). 
 
There are two important and inter-related points to make here.  First, as noted 
above, the core theoretical basis of the narrative is an extremely simple reading of 
human capital theory, and a great deal of the research evidence that is deployed in 
support of the narrative in official documents springs from rate of return analyses or 
calculations of the wage premia that accrue to those possessing certain qualifications 
relative to the earnings of those with lower levels of qualification (see Leitch Review, 
2005 & 2006).  This paper is not the place for a detailed critique of either human 
capital theory or rate of return analyses.  The key point to note is that both are open to 
criticism (see Coffield, 1999; Keep, Mayhew & Corney, 2002; Keep, 2009) and while 
providing useful insights, neither separately nor combined do they form a sufficiently 
broad base to support the weight of policy formation and the expectations attached to 
resultant policy moves. 
Second, this officially constructed narrative has dealt with the counter- factual 
by ignoring it almost completely.  There is little if any attempt by policy makers to 
engage with most of the bodies of literature associated with the topics listed above.  
They are simply deemed so unimportant, so at variance with received official wisdom, 
or so patently ideologically incorrect as to be unworthy of dignifying with official 
attention (even to take the effort to explain why they lack validity).  A prime example 
here would be the bibliography of the Leitch Review Final Report (2006), which is 
relatively short, and which draws very heavily on research on the rate of return to 
various types and levels of qualifications.  By contrast, there are only single 
references to the research on the relationship between skills and product market 
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strategy, the use of qualifications in the recruitment and selection process (all the 
government’s own, extensive research on this key topic is ignored), and to the links 
between skills policies and economic development; and none at all to the extant 
bodies of work on how workplace learning/training takes place, the changing meaning 
of ‘skill’, and the factors that determine demand for and usage of skill in workplace 
settings.  It is as though most of the last decade’s education and training, business 
strategy and economic development policy research (in the UK and elsewhere) had 
never taken place.  As a result of this highly selective reading of the evidence, the 
Leitch Review produced analysis and prescription that has a very limited hold on the 
actual complexities of the skills linkages to, and interactions with, both competitive 
strategy and labour markets (Centre for Enterprise, 2007). 
Thus, the no-go areas of ideology and research in turn have determined those 
avenues of policy that public debate is not permitted to explore.  Reviews of 
international research on economic development and education and training suggest a 
wide range of different forms that policy interventions might take.  The problem is 
that the filters provided by the narrative have meant that many of them are not 
available for discussion.  A by no means exhaustive list of these excluded items has 
included: 
· Regulation of the labour market to limit casualised hire and fire policies. 
· Regulation of the labour market to shut off access to competitive strategies 
based on low wages (e.g. significantly and sustained rises in national 
minimum wage, strong trade unions) 
· Full-blown social partnership arrangements 
· Sectoral bargaining arrangements that cover skills 
· Strong trade unions able to conclude sectoral agreements on skill 
· Statutory forms of co-determination in the workplace 
· An apprenticeship system backed by strong societal expectations and legal 
obligations that reduce exploitative practices by employers 
· A coherent vision of what type of economy and employment is being 
aimed for 
· National industrial policy 
· Creation of conditions that ensure ‘patient and competent’ capital (i.e. 
reform of the banking system and capital markets) 
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Overview 
The encapsulation offered above is at best a thumbnail sketch of what is, in some 
senses at least, a grand, if rather shallow, design.  For a full understanding of both the 
strengths (in terms of internal coherence) and the weaknesses of the narrative (in 
terms of its divorce from wider bodies of theory and from the reality of learning), 
readers are directed to the following documents, which represent the narrative at its 
fullest level of development: LSC, 2001; H M Treasury, 2002; DfES/HMT/DTI/ 
DWP, 2003; DfES/DTI/HMT/DWP, 2005; DfES, 2004 & 2006; Leitch Review, 2005 
& 2006; DIUS, 2007. 
The Style of the Narrative 
This paper does not attempt any in-depth analysis of the discourse(s) through which 
the narrative is conveyed.  That would represent a major enterprise that would require 
a separate paper.  For an illustration of the essential continuity of the form and 
substance of the debate, see Mansfield (2000). 
However, two brief sallies into this area are worth making.  First, it needs to 
be stressed that the language around ‘skill’ is often deployed within the narrative with 
a lack of precision that is both deliberate and depressing.  For example, official 
documents slide from skills to qualifications, and from unqualified (or qualified below 
government target levels) to unskilled and unemployed/lacking employability as 
though the terms were synonymous.  One of the worst culprits on this count was the 
Leitch Review, both of whose reports conflate skill and qualification, despite at the 
same time acknowledging in passing the inadequacy of qualifications as a good 
measure of skill. 
Second, the choice of language used to drive the narrative and the policy 
debates that surround it has a significant role to play in helping to close off 
opportunities for reflection and debate (Stronach & Morris, 1994; Trowler, 2001; 
Finlay et al, 2006:5-6).  A flavour of this style of discourse is offered below.  It is 
derived from notes taken by the author at a workshop session at a DfES conference to 
mark the launch of the Progress Report on the formation of the Skills Strategy in 
2003.  The phrases are taken from contemporaneous notes of consecutive speeches 
given by two speakers – one a very senior DfES official, the other a very senior LSC 
official.  No break has been recorded in the transcription as both deployed identical 
modes of communication and approaches to vocabulary: 
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Targeting resources… appropriate learning opportunities… transparent 
structures… cross- linking rhetorics… commitment to co-ordination… 
addressing financial barriers… opportunities for access and 
progression… engaging with employers… suite of strategies and 
policies… reaching out to learners… clear and flexible pathways… 
processes that can support our key strategies… the Success for All 
Agenda… coherence in provision… significant opportunity… funding 
reform…  a range of key issues… demand-led… a much more 
strategic approach to provision… supportive and hopefully accessible 
documents… brokerage function… building successful learning 
brands… a much more deep-seated set of cultural changes… need to 
drill down… sustainable input and change… moving with pace and 
achieving mass change… aligning planning, funding and delivery 
systems… engaged with those clients… signposting viable routes… 
mainstream that activity… where partnership is real, transformatory 
and genuine… high quality advice and guidance… 
Besides the enthusiasm for redundant adjectives, it will be noted that the 
model or prime source of this discourse is the modern management textbook, 
seemingly ideologically neutral, devoid of much thought or meaning (and therefore 
hard to disagree with), but ideal for conveying the impression of rationality, 
inevitability, and forward momentum – what Stronach and Morris (1994: 13) term 
‘Good Words’. 
In this regard, style and form fo llow sense and purpose, since the 
overwhelming central drive behind institutional design in the learning and skills 
sector has been to promote the kind of centralised forecasting, planning and control 
mechanisms advocated in late 1950s operation research texts, to use it to deliver 
consecutive waves of change, and to manage all this by means of a very traditional 
Modernist machine bureaucracy (Keep, 2002).  Stronach and Morris observation that, 
‘vocationalism is the modernist project par excellence, expressing modernism’s core 
values of progress, prosperity, technology, individual and social self- realisations, and 
the future health and wealth of capitalism’ (1994: 17) is hence apposite.  Indeed one 
of the senior architects of the narrative revealed in an interview with the Times 
Educational Supplement, that his view of his role in designing and superintending 
reform of the education and training system was that of acting as a ‘project engineer’ 
(Nash, 2005: 2).  Interestingly, this tendency towards a use of a ‘business language’ 
vocabulary by DIUS has been sharply criticised for its vacuity and inappropriateness 
by the House of Commons Committee on Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills 
(2009a). 
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The Continuity of the Narrative 
As noted above, this narrative has been constructed gradually and incrementally over 
a 30 year period (the start date is assumed to be around 1976 and James Callaghan’s 
Ruskin Speech), though its foundations go back far further, into mid- to late- 19th  
Century debates about Britain’s apparent relative economic decline (Barnett, 1986; 
Sanderson, 1988; Merson, 1995).  It reflects an underlying continuity in the 
ideological assumptions behind the general direction of policy development over the 
last two decades or more (Mansfield, 2000; Keep, 2006b).  Thus, in the field of 
learning and skills the basis for policy under New Labour has not moved in a 
direction that fundamentally diverges from education and training policy under the 
Thatcher and Major administrations. 
Insofar as New Labour have altered and enlarged the basic story, the main 
variations are threefold.  First, as a result of a more buoyant economy and 
unemployment levels much lower than those experienced in the 1980s (at least until 
now), there has been less need for large-scale training/work experience schemes to 
reduce the claimant headcount.  At the same time, perceptions of major problems with 
income inequality and low levels of social mobility have meant pressure on 
government to address social equity issues.  Skills policies have been viewed as a 
means of dealing with these concerns without requiring government to engage in 
more heavily overt and direct forms of redistribution (Blair, 2007).  As a result, there 
has been growing confidence among policy makers in the range of policy expectations 
and goals that can be loaded onto education and training (for example, enhanced 
social inclusion and social mobility) (see Keep, 2002 & 2006b). 
Second, New Labour have increased the overall level of investment in skill. In 
this regard, it should be noted that the lion’s share of the extra cash has gone into 
schools and pre-19 provision, and non-HE post-19 provision has not fared anything 
like so well. 
Third, under New Labour the centralising tendencies put in motion by 
previous Conservative administrations have been moved up a gear, with the range of 
powers given to ministers increasing with every piece of legislation.  Despite 
deploying the rhetoric of partnership, the centre has taken more and more 
responsibility unto itself and has appeared exceedingly reluctant to share this with any 
other party (Keep, 2006a).  Design, in detail, from the centre has been the order of the 
day.  For example, as Michael Young has noted (personal communication with 
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author) it is hard to imagine the current English administration funding anything so 
anarchic and devolved as the Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI). 
The generally high degree of evolutionary continuity in the basic structural 
foundations and premises of policy has been disguised by hyperactivism (Dunleavy & 
O’Leary, 1987) – the ceaseless whirl of policy pronouncements, and institutional and 
programmatic reform that has occurred over the last twenty years (Mansfield, 2000).  
New schemes, and new bodies to deliver them, have helped hide the essential 
sameness in the overall direction of policy and of the narrow conceptualisation that 
underpins it (Coffield, 2008: 43). 
The Function of the Narrative – Limiting the Possible, Controlling the Present, 
Defining the Future  
The effects and uses of this narrative 
As noted above, English education and training policy formation and the means by 
which it is delivered, is, by mainstream European standards, extremely centralised and 
top-down.  The major roles allotted to elected local government and to social 
partnership arrangements in many European countries are largely absent here (Ainley, 
2001).  Given the scale and complexity of the range of policy issues and streams of 
delivery that are planned, funded and managed by central government a key issue is 
how to co-ordinate this ‘new Leviathan’ (Ainley, 2001) and its multi- faceted activities 
and responsibilities.  The following comment from David Normington, the then-
permanent secretary at the then newly-formed DfES, illustrates this problem: 
Today the department – and the whole education and training system – 
is at the heart of the Government’s drive to transform public services.  
The days when the education department set the legislative framework, 
hoped that local education authorities would take most of the major 
decisions, and occasionally signalled policy changes in circulars are 
long past.  The scale of the tasks we face will not allow it.  
(Normington, 2001: 17) 
This quote both illuminates the need for the narrative, and, as we have seen, reflects 
some of its central tenets, not least that skills policy is far too important to be left to or 
determined by people outside central government. 
In England, DIUS and DCSF have to direct and co-ordinate the activities of a 
range of bodies, some of which (QCA, Ofsted, the SSCs, the RDAs (and their 
associated Regional Skills Partnerships), the LSC (and its regional and local arms), 
Education/Business Partnerships, the Learning and Skills Network, Connexions and 
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Local Authorities) are creatures of government, while others are to a greater or lesser 
extent independent organisations (e.g. awarding bodies, UCAS and the Campaign for 
Learning). 
One key means by which the frames of thought and action of these various 
tiers of organisation are concerted is through the creation and maintenance by central 
government of a shared narrative, the bones of which have been sketched in above.  
The creation of such narratives or ‘myths’ as a means of structuring decision making 
and interaction within and between organisations has best been expounded by Boje, 
Fedor and Rowland (1982).  They argue that myths are forged as a means of 
establishing and maintaining shared meanings and understandings: 
Myth making is an adaptive mechanism whereby groups in an 
organization maintain logic frameworks within which to attribute 
meaning to activities and events.  The meanings that organize past 
activities and events into a system of logic then become the basis for 
legitimizing present and future behaviors… Without such an adaptive 
system, the technological and administrative structure would lack 
sufficient  shared meaning to serve as a basis for coordinated behavior 
in the face of excessive uncertainty.  For those who become socialized 
into an organization, myths constitute a factual and highly objective 
reality.  They are a major part of the taken-for-granted assumptions and 
common-sense theories of organizational experience… A myth is 
constructed to exemplify why the given practices and procedures are 
the ‘only way’ the organization can function effectively… Myths are a 
form of ‘bounding’, permitting meaningful organizational behavior to 
occur, while glossing over excessive complexity, turbulence, or 
ambiguity.  Myths narrow the horizon in which organizational life is 
allowed to make sense.  (Boje, Fedor & Rowland, 1982:18). 
In addition to justifying/sanctifying practices and procedures as the ‘only way’ 
things can function, the systemic mythic narrative that has underlain the policy 
discourse of English education and training in the learning and skills sector has also 
encoded a set of ideological assumptions about public policy in terms of why and in 
what ways it is legitimate for the state to intervene in the area of skill formation.  In 
essence, as we shall see, these ideological assumptive beliefs have stressed the 
impossibility or inadvisability of intervention in the regulation of product, capital or 
labour markets, and have posited the Learning and Skills sector as a means – indeed 
the chief means – by which the state can legitimately seek to improve national 
competitiveness and social justice (Keep, 2006a). 
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The multiple functions of the narrative 
As Ball (2008: 5) observes: 
Policy discourses… organise their own specific rationalities, making 
particular sets of ideas obvious, common sense and ‘true’. Discourses 
mobilise truth claims and constitute rather than simply reflect social 
reality… the ways in which policies are spoken and spoken about, their 
vocabularies, are part of the creation of their conditions of acceptance 
and enactment. They construct the inevitable and the necessary. 
Thus, the narrative device underpinning learning and skills policy has served a 
number of purposes.  It: 
· Provides a relatively simple ‘story’ about the skills ‘problem’ that can be 
understood by all actors and forms a shared basis for action.  Its simplicity 
is its strength. 
· Explains why skills policy is so important to desired economic and social 
goals and justifies government intervention (due to market failure) and 
funding/power/resources/political attention for the education and training 
system 
· Provides a monolithic ‘received wisdom’ analysis of the nature of the 
problem, which obviates the need for further reflection or thought. 
· Encapsulates and standardises the body of theory upon which policy is 
based (market failure, weak information, supply weaknesses, etc.) 
This narrative has therefore been viewed by its creators as a means of: 
· Obtaining and retaining material resources for education and training 
policies and the institutional framework that delivers them.  Discussions 
the author has held with members of the Leitch Review team suggest that 
one of the key goals of the Review (and the DfES who were co-sponsoring 
the Review), was to produce a case that would prise additional resources 
for skills policy from H M Treasury. 
· Saving time, by removing the need for individual policy makers to think 
through or reconsider the fundamental bases of policy.  These can be taken 
as fixed and given. 
· Helping create and reinforce collective identity and common purpose, 
thereby helping ‘concert’ the various elements and levels of the education 
and training system by providing a common ‘worldview’ and implicit 
mission statement that is shared by staff in both DIUS and DCSF and also 
their many subordinate agencies. 
· Delineating what is acceptable thought/lines of policy development, 
thereby inducing a self-discipline through common beliefs that helps ward 
off the danger of subordinate education and training bodies becoming 
motivated to develop new lines of thought or policy. 
· Fending off and/or rubbishing externally generated attempts to shift to any 
new paradigm and/or modify policy responses (Ball, 2008: 18). 
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Another important purpose served by the narrative is to provide continuity 
(what script writers term ‘backstory’) for everything that the education and training 
policy community does.  This is highly important in a world where both ministers and 
civil servants are constantly moving between jobs.  Since 1997 there have been six 
Secretaries of State for Education and Skills/Children, Families and Schools, and as 
Tuckett (2008: 8) points out, ‘in the past 20 years there have been 15 junior ministers 
in post with responsibilities for adult learning, and 15 different civil servants 
overseeing the work’.  This style of deploying the senior management cadres within 
central government leads to massive and continual memory loss among those who 
construct and control the debate (see Higham and Yeomans, 2007 for an interesting 
account of causes and the implications of what they term ‘policy amnesia’ in English 
14-19 policy). 
An additional factor has been the growth of consultants as part of the 
‘machinery of thought’ in government – consultants, by their nature, are always just 
passing through.  These problems are compounded by the lack of other, independent 
centres of memory or power – for instance, England has no equivalent of Federal 
Germany’s institute for vocational learning - BiBB.  At senior levels in the English 
education and training policy community, the past is indeed another country, and the 
vast bulk of policy makers have neither the incentive, inclination nor means to visit it 
except via the received wisdom embedded in the extant policy narrative.  Thus, civil 
servants or junior ministers who arrive from outside the education and training world 
are provided with a ready-made worldview and theory of action. 
Transmission mechanisms 
How has the narrative been transmitted and replicated through the education and 
training system?  The answer has lain in: 
· Ministerial statements, speeches and press releases 
· Major central government and government agency policy documents 
· Letters of guidance to agencies 
· Government and government agency newsletters 
· Speeches and articles by senior staff in agencies 
· The vast mass of minor policy documents 
· Government and governmental agency conferences and seminars 
· Training courses for civil servants and agency staff 
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· The expectations and goals embedded in the performance management 
systems (PMS) and targets that cascade down from the Treasury to DIUS 
and DCSF, and from them to their subordinate agencies, and which govern 
the priorities and actions of all publicly-funded actors. 
· Formal consultation exercises 
· The routines of the government’s spending round planning exercises 
More generally, and probably most importantly, at least some elements of the 
narrative have formed part of the embedded expectations and worldview of the vast 
bulk of central government and agency staff.  They have been part of the fabric of 
normative exchange within and between government bodies working in this area of 
policy and delivery.  To think outside the central messages encoded in the narrative or 
to question its basic tenets is unusual, and the vast majority of civil servants and 
agency staff have given very little appearance of seeking to do this.  Those who have 
failed to conform through acquiescence to the veracity of the narrative have risked 
being labelled, at best ‘eccentric’, and at worst as being in some way disloyal to 
ministers and to their colleagues. 
The narrative and public debate 
At one level there is active and vigorous public policy debate about education and 
training  – via thinktanks, events and conferences sponsored by, for example, the 
Nuffield 14-19 Review, the Campaign for Learning, LSC and many others; plus 
numerous official consultations by LSC, QCA and DCSF, DIUS and the Cabinet 
Office.  How can such a debate be reconciled with the monolithic, unitarist worldview 
outlined above, not least, as the narrative it supports has been designed to ensure 
closure of any substantive discussion about policy directions other than those already 
endorsed by central government? 
The answer, put crudely, is threefold.  First, unlike certain aspects of policy as 
it applies to schools and higher education, debates within the learning and skills sector 
take place more or less outside the spotlight of mainstream media attention.  The 
national press and television news agenda does not normally encompass issues to do 
with vocational (or adult) learning.  In part, this is because the media are generally 
concerned with the type of educational route with which its staff are most familiar, 
and through which the offspring of ‘middle England’ (a popular euphemism for the 
middle classes) pass.  This means that areas such as further education, adults and 
young people following vocational courses and apprenticeship are not subject to 
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anything like the same level of scrutiny as school or university reforms. This relative 
absence of general media attention gives policy makers far greater freedom, and 
means that debates about non-A level, non-HE post-compulsory education and 
training rarely spill over from specialist ‘trade’ publications aimed at those working in 
the system into the national press.  Out of the limelight, control of the policy agenda is 
far easier to maintain. 
The second reason is that the majority of the debate is conducted within the 
terms established by the narrative and those who create it.  The vast bulk of discussion 
concerns the best means to implement decisions about education and training already 
made by central government.  It is normally about the ‘how’ of policy 
implementation, only infrequently about the ‘what’, and almost never about the 
underlying ‘why’. On those relatively rare occasions when dissenting opinions have 
been voiced, for example by individual researchers or trade unionists, they have had 
limited impact as those holding these views have normally possessed little in the way 
of a powerbase within the structures that formulate or even deliver policy.  They have 
been the voice of the outsider. 
Third, the process of debate and the views and ideas that it uncovers are often 
detached from any influence over the actual process of high- level policy formation.  
The formulation of education and training policy for the learning and skills sector 
until very recently has been incredibly centralised (see Keep, 2006b) and the 
fundamentals of policy have probably normally been dictated by a very small and 
very closed community of ministers, advisors, thinktank staff, management 
consultants and senior civil servants, numbering perhaps 50 souls.  For three very 
interesting mapping exercises on who has wielded power (albeit as it applied to 
schools policy), see Passmore (2001), Slater (2005) and Ball (2008). 
Only rarely does policy formation in the learning and skills sector move 
outside the closed circle.  The absence of powerful elected local government or social 
partnership organisations with the clout given by an institutional framework wherein 
they are embedded, has meant that central government is firmly in charge, and able to 
set the form and agenda of policy. 
Members of the charmed central government circle sometimes participate in 
the formal manifestations of public debate insofar as they deliver speeches at events, 
but the communication is unidirectional – there is no real engagement or discussion, 
not least because policy is already decided and not open for renegotiation.  The 
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minister delivers a pre-prepared speech (normally written for him or her by civil 
servants), and may answer some questions from the audience.  That is generally the 
extent of the debate.  The minister generally does not stay for the whole event, or 
mingle in any unstructured way with delegates.  The exception, in very recent times, 
has been John Denham’s (the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and 
Skills) willingness to engage in more open-ended discussions about the future of non-
vocational adult learning. 
As a result of this approach, much of the national debate has been: 
· A form of organisational promotion (for whichever body is hosting the 
event). 
· An opportunity to offer the form and semblance of dynamic 
leadership/activity by those at the centre of policy.  The debate is a 
platform for their thoughts, presence and implicit power to command 
action. 
· A means of enlisting support/approval for what has already been decided 
elsewhere. 
· A transmission mechanism, whereby central government’s priorities are 
cascaded down through the education and training system and messages 
about new priorities communicated to subordinate actors. 
· A form of displacement activity. 
· A safety valve for marginal dissent – an opportunity for letting off steam. 
· A form of collective daydreaming, whereby those involved in the 
education and training system can fantasise about the way in which the 
latest reform/programme/initiative will bring about a solution to long-
standing problems (the ‘this time it will be different’ daydream). 
Ultimately, debate has often been a ritualistic activity that central government has 
undertaken or engaged with in order to clothe a centralised decision making system in 
some shreds of wider participation.  It has, for other stakeholders, formed a collective 
fiction that they sustain because the alternative would be to admit their own 
powerlessness. 
Mechanisms for protecting the narrative’s integrity 
The question of how the many players within the learning and skills sector interact 
with the narrative is one that would require another paper to deal with properly.  All 
that is attempted here is to sketch in some of the broad general principles that have 
tended to govern this interaction and to offer the outline of an explanation as to why 
changing the shape and direction of the narrative has proved so hard. 
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The narrative has evolved in a manner that, in part by accident, in part by 
design, renders it highly resistant to any form of fundamental revision and thereby has 
helped ensure a strong degree of path dependency for the policies that have resulted.  
At one level, this is because it has been an expression and embodiment of a set of 
fundamental ideological choices by policy makers about how England can and should 
confront a range of economic and social challenges.  It has represented a ‘gospel of 
vocationalism’ (Grubb, 2004; Grubb & Lazerson, 2004), wherein more schooling, 
training and skills can be deployed to tackle a huge range of social and economic ills 
without resort to other forms of intervention that are less acceptable within a neo-
liberal paradigm (Keep, 2006b; Keep & Mayhew, forthcoming). 
Because the shape of the narrative has been derived from fundamental 
ideological choices about what forms of state intervention are possible and acceptable, 
it is an extremely rigid and perhaps brittle construct – it is hard to effect significant 
change to any individual element without undermining the rationale for the whole 
edifice.  A bit like an ice palace, the narrative might shatter or melt, but it cannot 
easily bend or adapt.  For example, the moment that it is accepted that increases in the 
supply of skills are, on their own, insufficient to produce the desired effects, then 
attention has to shift to usage and that in turn means attention on (and intervention in) 
the workplace, which policy currently holds to be a sealed ‘black box’ (Keep, 2002).  
As English civil servants have repeatedly remarked to the author, government cannot 
be seen to be telling employers what to do about how they manage and deploy their 
staff.  Again, if enhanced skills only deliver results as part of a wider economic 
development and business improvement strategy, then the government finds itself in 
the position of having to ‘pick winners’ and tell business what it ought to be doing to 
improve.  As will be discussed in the concluding section, it appears that we may be 
reaching the point where precisely just such an admission is being wrung from 
government, with what long-term consequences for the narrative it is as yet unclear. 
At another level, the narrative’s longevity of itself has invested it with 
considerable power.  Indeed, its resonance has been reinforced by ceaseless repetition 
in a lengthy succession of policy documents (Mansfield, 2000), whereby the narrative 
has achieved a liturgical status as the vehicle for the recitation of time-hallowed and 
fundamental ‘truths’.  As such, it has taken on the classic role of myth – it exists 
beyond mere fact and is accepted at a subconscious, often unreflexive level – so 
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commonplace a set of understandings as to be beyond the need for reflection or debate 
(Boje, Fedor and Rowland, 1982).  What would there be to discuss? 
A second reason is that there are considerable material consequences attendant 
on any substantial revision.  In other words, those who have propagated the narrative 
probably stand to lose if it is revised.  As argued above, the narrative has been 
developed and deployed in part as a means of securing additional resources – political 
capital and salience and public spending – for the central government department that 
has the chief remit in the area of skills (see Blunkett, 2001 as a prime example of the 
importance of education and training being used to try and secure resources within 
central government).  Any change in the narrative that led to a downplaying of the 
centrality of skill supply and a shift towards other policy approaches, for example 
economic development policies or reform of employment relations, work organisation 
and job design, would mean less power and money for DCSF and DIUS and their 
empire of subordinate agencies.  Self- interest is hence a major motivation for 
subordinate agencies in not disrupting the narrative. 
As a result, those who believe in and benefit from the narrative in its current 
form have tried to ensure that external agents are not allowed to tinker with it.   Even 
within central government access to opportunities to redefine or refine the narrative 
have been very limited in number and the identity of those who have had access to 
them subject to considerable scrutiny.  Thus in undertaking a fundamental review of 
long-term skills policy (and hence the assumptions that underlie such policy) the 
deliberations of the Treasury-sponsored Leitch Review came under intense scrutiny 
from, and attempts to influence by, the DfES. 
We also need to acknowledge the possibility that many policy makers have 
become so attached to the narrative (for both material and immaterial reasons) that 
efforts to disrupt or change it are subject to the occurrence of cognitive dissonance, or 
what Argyris (quoted in Crossman, 2003: 41) terms ‘defensive reasoning’ whereby 
facts and theories that cannot be assimilated into the received wisdom of the narrative 
or world view are either ignored or discarded (see also Festinger et al, 1964; Stronach 
& Morris, 1994; Lumby & Foskett, 2007).  Those who research strategic decision 
making in the private sector term this phenomenon ‘bounded awareness’, wherein, 
‘cognitive blinders prevent a person from seeing, seeking, using, or sharing highly 
relevant, easily accessible, and readily perceivable information during the decision-
making process… Most executives are not aware of the specific ways in which their 
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awareness is limited’ (Bazerman & Chugh, 2006: 90).  One of the key elements of 
bounded awareness is a tendency not to seek data that might pose a counter factual 
challenge to the received wisdom that the organisation and its decision makers already 
accept. 
It is interesting to note that over the last two decades, by far the most serious 
attempt to review and alter the narrative came from a central government inquiry into 
skills mounted by the Cabinet Office’s Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU).  This 
sought to transfer attention away from the supply of skills by the publicly-funded 
education and training system towards problems concerning low levels of demand for 
skills in the UK economy, poor usage of skills once created, and the need for public 
policy to give greater attention to the demand side.  There is not space to discuss in 
detail how the guardians of the narrative responded to this challenge (for accounts see 
Coffield, 2002; Keep, 2002 & 2006b), but their main device was to graft the language 
of demand onto existing policy discourses, leaving the underlying fundamentals of 
policy unchanged.  As the PIU had no direct control over policy – it was essentially 
an internal government ‘think tank’ – it proved relatively easy for policy departments 
with a heavy investment in the existing narrative to maintain the status quo. 
Moreover, actors within central government have had at their disposal a range 
of sticks and carrots that could be deployed to reward or discipline those in 
subordinate agencies (such as the LSC) who are expected to repeat the mantras 
encoded in the narrative.  In other words, the narrative does not necessarily need to 
rely on its own internal coherence or intellectual force to survive, there are more 
direct supporting mechanisms in place to both ensure its continuity and help enforce 
central government’s will across the education and training system.  There is not time 
to explore these in any detail here, but they include: 
· Patronage of appointment and removal of those who disappoint or dissent 
(not least within the agency’s senior management). 
· The honours system offers important symbolic rewards for those who play 
the game and refrain from rocking the boat. 
· The threat (and reality) of the disbandment of agencies on a regular basis 
helps prevent the emergence of organised interest representation to 
emerge.  The history of sectoral bodies is a good example, with changes 
from Industry Training Board (ITB) to Non-Statutory Training 
Organisation (NSTO) to Industry Training Organisation (ITO) to National 
Training Organisation (NTO) to Sector Skills Council (SSC), and now 
with the ‘re-licensing’ of SSCs ongoing as a means of reminding everyone 
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where funding for these bodies and control over their ultimate fate really 
lies (i.e. central government). 
· Most importantly, control of funding.  This extends beyond direct 
government agencies, such as the LSC, to cover what are nominally 
employer bodies, such as the SSCs, and to the trade union movement via 
government funding of Unionlearn.  Recipients of government funding 
understand that there is an implicit deal, wherein biting the hand that feeds 
you (particularly if the biting takes place within a public forum) is unlikely 
to go unpunished. 
Given that many aspects of the narrative are either a massive simplification of 
reality or at considerable variance with it, it might be expected that the interaction 
between those central government officials who are authors and guardians of the 
narrative and the day-to-day workings of the education and training system would 
throw up problems, and thereby tend to highlight discontinuities between the 
framework that has been constructed to explain the system’s purposes and functioning 
and what actually happens in practice.  In fact, this has rarely occurred.  One of the 
functions of the battery of subordinate agencies and quangos managed by DCSF and 
DIUS is to insulate ministers (and to a lesser extent senior civil servants) from 
uncontrolled instances of contact with the actual functioning of the education and 
training system.  The system is experienced second or third hand through the filter of 
intermediary bodies and layers of management.  Dissenting voices are removed, 
messages from the front line are sanitised and success stories and ‘killer facts’ played 
up. 
A good example has been the manner in which employers have hitherto been 
engaged with.  To begin with, contact between employers and central government has 
been limited and weak (DfES, 2002).  In addition, ministers and senior policy staff 
normally have only ever met a carefully selected band of employers who are 
education and training enthusiasts – those who sit on official task forces, working 
parties and conference platforms.  They have been drawn mainly from large 
companies.  Moreover, as the narrative has evolved it has tended to privilege the 
interests of employers over that of other actors (Leitch Review, 2006; DfES, 2007) 
and policy has offered the promise of more government subsidy directed at 
employers’ training efforts, for example, through Train to Gain.  In these 
circumstances, and for as long as the narrative refrained from placing any direct, 
enforceable burdens on them, employers have had every reason to go along with the 
story the government has seemed so intent upon telling. 
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A final potential source of disruption might be research and its findings.  
However, as indicated above, the narrative has dealt with research in ways that tend to 
neutralise its impact.  Isolated pieces of data (‘killer facts’ as policy makers like to 
refer to them) have been deployed in support of particular assumptions or policies.  
As previously noted, the bulk of these have been derived from a relatively narrow 
spectrum of economics research (for example, rates of return analyses on particular 
forms or levels of qualification), or from forecasts of future skill demand.  By 
contrast, findings from business literature, industrial relations and personnel 
management have tended to be ignored.  Furthermore, the institutional mechanisms 
whereby research findings could be brought to bear on policy, or through which 
policy makers might be confronted with alternative explanatory frameworks, are 
almost totally absent.  For instance, DCSF, DIUS and the LSC all lack an expert panel 
or research forum on skills that could allow a structured conduit between the worlds 
of research and policy.  The only body that has ever maintained such an institution has 
been the SSDA (a tradition carried over into the new UKCES).  As Grubb observes: 
Policy is often driven by narratives, or widely-accepted ‘stories’ about 
why certain programs are worthwhile.  The creation of such narratives 
typically takes a considerable period of time and many participants.  
Once widely accepted, policy narratives like the Education Gospel, or 
human capital, are resistant to change, and subtle empirical evidence – 
the results that research can generate – is not usually enough to modify 
or complicate a policy narrative.  (Grubb, 2004: 61). 
Counter Arguments 
Earlier versions of this paper have been met with some accusations that it paints an 
overly deterministic and pessimistic picture of the English skills policy scene.  These 
criticisms fall into two camps.  The first points to the complexity of the New Labour 
political project and the need for nuance in describing and analysing its central 
components.  In particular, some (Coffield et al, 2008; Hodgson, Spours & Steer, 
2008) follow Hall (2003) in arguing that New Labour has been engaged in a subtle 
‘double-shuffle’ process, the existence of which invalidates a simple reading of 
policy. 
The second, and often allied criticism, suggests that whatever the form of 
national policy and the rhetoric that surrounds it, such policy and the institutional 
settlements and programmatic structures that it supports are subsequently subject to 
high levels of mediation and re- interpretation by subordinate delivery agencies, 
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practitioners and learners, and that this process in fact represents a potent form of 
covert divergence from, and resistance to, central policy diktats.  In other words, in 
reality, power is more decentralised than the narrative’s view of formal policies and 
structures might suggest because ultimately those who deliver policy get the final 
word on how it works in practice. 
Within the confines of this paper, there are three relatively brief responses that 
can be made.  The first is that, at least to some degree, they are justified and that in 
order to clarify exposition and stimulate debate, the arguments presented in this paper 
set to one side the many conflicts over policy that occur among the circle of senior 
policy makers at the heart of central government.  The paper may also over-play the 
power of the centre to shape and ultimately dominate both the policy discourse and 
the power structures within the education and training system via the narrative. 
Notwithstanding the above, the second counter-argument is to accept that 
subordinate agencies, their staff and those who work in education and training 
providers do indeed expend much time and energy in softening the edges of poorly-
designed and centrally-dictated schemes and programmes, and in tailoring these to 
meet a series of complex realities of which their architects in DfES (now DCSF and 
DIUS) have remained blissfully unaware.  Indeed, the success of the system in no 
small parts probably rests on the ability of the grassroots delivery system to quietly re-
design and re-direct the detailed implementation of policy. 
The critical problem with this line of argument is that, as suggested above, the 
narrative is focused on setting the broad ideological agenda and constructing the 
assumptive world within which practice takes place.  In other words, it is primarily 
concerned with control of strategic policy (including how the education and training 
system should be configured), not with delivery, implementation or grassroots 
practice.  There are other mechanisms (for example Ofsted inspections) to address 
these needs.  Furthermore, there is a big difference between lower level policy staff 
and practitioners seeking to adjust policy implementation and practice at the margins, 
and their challenging the central conceptual tenets and power relationships that policy 
relies upon.  At this level – active resistance rather than quiet and hidden minor 
subversion – the silence has been fairly deafening.  Put briefly, in terms of openly 
dissenting voices from major stakeholders inside the education and training system, 
while there have been some attempts to dispute secondary elements of the narrative 
(particularly as they relate to the necessity for central control of the system), there has 
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been almost no overt challenge of any sort to the central elements of the ‘gospel of 
vocationalism’.  The one major exception has been campaigning by various parties 
against the transfer of funds to support Train to Gain and the resultant damage to adult 
non-vocational learning, though even here the LSC and its Council members have 
remained publicly loyal to the government’s line. 
As has already been hinted at, in part the reluctance of stakeholders within the 
education and training system, such as providers, represents a realisation of self-
interest in that the narrative may incorporate some elements that are less than 
appealing to them, but at its core it provides the raison d’être for the allocation of 
enhanced levels of resourcing (money, staffing, student/trainee numbers, capital 
investment and political salience) for education and training from which they all 
benefit to some degree.  As a result, insofar as there is contestation, it is very often 
over resource allocation between competing interests – for example, between FE 
colleges and private training providers.  In a sense, contestability and marketisation, 
besides their supposed efficiency gains, also afford central policy makers the 
opportunities offered to any colonial administrator by classic ‘divide and rule’ tactics. 
The third point that can be made is that Hall’s (2003) depiction of the New 
Labour project is not undisputed (see, for example, various contributors in Daniels 
and McIlroy, 2009).  However, even if Hall’s analysis is accepted in full, neo-
liberalism is a broad enough ideological stance to support a spectrum of 
interpretations and forms, and musings on the deployment of a ‘social democratic’ 
variant of neo- liberalism (or neo- liberalism with a smiley face, as this author would 
put it) are not inconsistent with this interpretation.  The problem is that, as Hall 
admits, the dominant step in the double-shuffle (the two steps forward) is strongly 
neo- liberal in character and intent, and the social democratic component is the 
subordinate (the half-step back).  As a result, what emerges from this ‘third way’ is 
inherently a variant of neo-liberalism and not any form of social democracy.  
Elements such as meaningful social partnership have remained wholly absent from 
New Labour’s education and training policy model (Keep, Lloyd & Payne, 
forthcoming). 
It might also be noted that there is another, largely unacknowledged potential 
reason for strong policy continuity between Conservative and New Labour 
governments, and that is the underlying staffing of the detailed policy formation 
processes by a civil service that over time has become increasingly unable (even if it 
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were willing) to engage with, or conceive of, anything other than a broadly neo- liberal 
paradigm.  It might be noted that May 2009 will witness the 30th anniversary of the 
arrival of neo- liberal government in the UK, and such an unbroken underlying 
ideological continuity has had a cumulative impact on the civil service, the vast bulk 
of whose members have now not worked under any government of a different 
ideological hue.  Thus their assumptive world is often founded on neo- liberal 
principles, and the default position for policy formation tends to be the impossibility 
of anything that is not based on lines of policy development that have been 
established over the last three decades – hence the canonical status of the narrative 
discussed above. 
One chink in the armour of contemporary English education and training 
policy might be taken to be the deployment of rhetoric around a ‘new localism’.  
While the new localism certainly exists as a vaguely specified concept or slogan, it is 
open to criticism on at least two fronts.  First, is hard to see many concrete signs of 
serious devolution of power (as opposed to operational responsibility) from central 
government to elected local government (see Payne’s (2009) discussion of the 
impending transfer of 14-19 funding to Local Authorities).  Indeed, the general 
direction of travel under New Labour has been the creation of ever-more un-elected 
agencies and bodies whose activities are directed by central government departments.  
As a result, it is hard not to conclude that the democratic deficit has grown, not 
diminished. 
In this regard, the proposed transition from the LSC to the new Skills Funding 
Agency (SFA) is illuminating.  Although the LSC’s Chair and Council, at least in 
public, found themselves either seriously disinclined or incapable of challenging 
government over any major element of policy, none the less DIUS have chosen a new 
model of governance for post-19 funding that centres on a Next Steps agency that will 
have neither chair nor council.  The SFA will in effect simply be the secretary of 
state’s ‘cat’s paw’ – a body without the semblance of independence, through which 
the structure and policies of the FE system can be altered at ministerial whim and 
without any serious debate involving other stakeholders and interests.  It is not a 
development liable to engender optimism about a transition to a more open and 
devolved power structure in English education and training governance. 
Second, the English state’s model of governance for education and training 
can perhaps best be judged in comparison to models found elsewhere.  Such 
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comparisons are illuminating.   When contrasted with the vast majority of other 
European countries, our system is exceedingly strongly centralised and un-devolved 
(Keep, 2006b).  Even within the UK, the Scottish system offers an example of a far 
more balanced and dispersed dispensation of power, operating with far higher levels 
of trust than could be presently dreamed of in England. 
The final point that needs to be made here is that the bulk of those who work 
inside the policy machinery of English education and training are every bit as much 
victims of the narrative’s attempts to limit thought as are college principals, teachers, 
lecturers, trainers and the host of other practitioners whose working lives are driven 
by the priorities forged by state policy and its associated targets.  One of the great 
strengths of the narrative (from its architects’ point of view) is that it provides a 
mechanism for closing down internal debate and novel thinking within the policy 
process. 
Last Thoughts 
This paper has argued that the chief functions of the narrative have been threefold: 
1. To freeze thinking and analysis at a particular stage of development – one 
that locks policies into a broadly neo- liberal paradigm wherein skills 
policy concentrates on the narrow goal of delivering a supply-side push. 
2. To secure political attention and resources for education and training as an 
area of policy and activity. 
3. To delineate how and in what directions policy can and cannot develop. 
As a result, English skills policy formulation has taken place within a tightly defined 
and artificial set of theoretical boundaries that have defined what ideas are acceptable 
inside the policy world and hence can be discussed, and what are unacceptable and 
therefore cannot be discussed.  In consequence, the skills debate has produced a self-
replicating repetition of a narrow range of discourses and policy interventions, which 
have often been constructed with limited regard to any external reality. 
A complex interaction between these elements has produced, over time, a 
system of central control by ministers and senior policy makers that mirrors the 
sentiments expressed in the quotation that starts this paper, and which has left 
subordinate bodies and agencies with a sharply circumscribed analytical and policy 
repertoire to draw upon.  More of the same is all that it has been possible to conceive 
of.  As a result, although the institutional forms have undergone constant change and 
‘reform’, the underlying policy trajectory has remained unchanged and highly 
   30 
resistant to substantive redefinition or re-focusing by those outside the sphere of 
central government. 
The narrative, acting in combination with other elements of control outlined 
above, such as volume targets as the main performance indicator, patronage and the 
designing out of autonomous power bases for interest groups that might challenge 
central government’s viewpoint, has been highly effective in supporting a very 
centralised education and training system.  Real debate about education and training 
policy has been closely circumscribed, and subordinate agencies have been left with a 
role that allows them to deliver policy but not influence its primary formation to any 
great degree. 
Re-writing the Story - Is Change Possible? 
As argued above, the narrative has been closely guarded by its creators and sponsors 
and disruption or amendment of any of its major elements has to date proved 
impossible, even to forces within central government (for example, the Cabinet office 
PIU project on workforce development).  Yet, as things have stood until very recently, 
only those inside central government have possessed the ultimate power to alter the 
foundations or structure of the narrative.  Fundamental change in the key elements of 
the narrative by other actors has been impossible because the institutional 
arrangements that might offer the leverage to enable this to happen have been wholly 
lacking in England.  Given this history, progress often appeared a remote possibility, 
and it was hard to see who or what might act as a catalyst for a re-think by national 
policy makers. 
A number of current, impending or possible events now however give rise to 
the potential for a substantive amendment of the narrative.  These disrupting factors 
are reviewed below. 
First, the election of any form of neo-conservative, right of centre 
administration along US lines might, via notions of a smaller state, undermine the 
rational for the complex and very expensive panoply of bodies that state management, 
funding and design of skills supply current requires.  The impending squeeze on 
public spending will give impetus to such developments who ever gains power at the 
next UK general election.  A right-of-centre government might also advocate the 
creation of a low tax, ‘can-do’ economy, wherein citizens, freed from the burden of an 
over- large and expensive state can invest their additional disposable income (created 
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through tax cuts) on education and training in order to better themselves and their 
children, thereby revolutionising economic performance and social mobility (for a 
blueprint of this model from a UK think tank, see Bosanquet et al, 2008). 
Such an approach would sweep away some elements of the current model, but 
simply heighten the importance of others.  To governments of the right as well as to 
those of the ‘centre left/right’ education and skills provide too tempting a policy lever 
for giving the appearance of tackling economic problems and social inequalities to be 
completely discarded.  Moreover, any further drift towards core neo- liberal values 
makes government still less keen to engage with any of the issues or alternative policy 
avenues that might deliver economic and social policy goals – redistributive taxation, 
issues of class, short-termism and the ‘financialisation’ of the UK economy and 
labour market regulation and employee relations issues.  The seeming ideological 
neutrality of skills as a point for intervention in the economic and social spheres and 
its apparent capacity to deliver win/win/win outcomes (for the individual, employers 
and the state/society) means that the skills narrative’s selling power might actually 
increase under a more overt neo- liberal political settlement, although the policy 
approaches and instruments it supported would undoubtedly shift somewhat. 
A second means by which the narrative might be disrupted is via analytical 
and policy divergence between the UK’s four national governments.  If a new 
narrative is forged that starts from different assumptions and leads to a new repertoire 
of policies that in turn generates superior outcomes to those associated with the 
English skills supply- led story, English policy makers might come under some 
pressure to take account of this success.  Obviously there are already many examples 
of other OECD countries that have developed (or are developing) different types of 
skills policies based on a somewhat divergently-founded framing of the policy 
problem, for example the Nordic states, Australia (with its skill ecosystems projects – 
see Alcorso & Windor, 2008) and New Zealand (New Zealand Government, 2008). 
Until now it has always been relatively easy for English policy makers to deny 
the relevance of experience in these countries, on the grounds that they are far away 
and their societal and economic makeup is radically different from our own – the 
Nordic states are always treated as some form of aberration, not least as they offend 
the dominant Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism and how it and its attached national 
units of production should function.  However, with the arrival of the Scottish Skills 
Strategy (Scottish Government, 2007a) and the Scottish Economic Strategy (2007b) a 
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very different form of skills/education and training policy framing has emerged inside 
the UK, and one that is generating a search for interventions that tackle the demand 
for, and usage of skill, as well as its enhanced supply.  Scotland is part of the UK and 
shares many characteristics with its English neighbour.  Moreover, a UK-wide policy 
concept transmission mechanism has sprung into being in the shape of the UK 
Commission on Employment and Skills (UKCES), and UKCES has already adopted 
skill demand and usage as major themes of their work (UKCES, 2008).  In support of 
this agenda, the UKCES’s research programme will be examining skill usage. 
This is an interesting and potentially important development.  UKCES was a 
body designed by the Leitch Review team, with at least some suspicion that one of the 
intended functions of the new organisation was to ‘de-devolve’ skills policy and re-
assert the primacy of the English policy viewpoint across the whole UK.  In the event, 
whatever the original intentions, the UKCES seems to be working in the opposite 
direction – acting as a vehicle for promoting and exploring policy concepts generated 
outwith England.  Both individual Commissioners and senior Commission staff 
appear intent upon testing (and perhaps amending) some key elements of the extant 
English policy narrative from inside the machinery of government.  UKCES reports 
directly to ministers and appears to be wielding a surprisingly strong influence, at 
least in these its early days. 
The birth of UKCES has also coincided with the unintended conjunction of 
two other factors – the Leitch targets and the collapse of the popular model of 
finance-driven economic growth and prosperity.  As argued above, the Leitch targets 
are both a result, and concrete embodiment, of the traditional English skills policy 
narrative.  They have been resoundingly and repeatedly endorsed by the government 
(and by many other actors).  Their achievement was (and is) predicated upon both the 
willingness of employers and individuals to make a massive, step change in their 
investment in skills at Levels 3 and 4; and more broadly upon a vision of economic 
policy and competitiveness that saw the country being powered towards a knowledge-
driven economy by a fast-growing and world-class finance and business services 
sector and by a consumer boom fuelled by credit and the housing market. 
Unfortunately, for government, the bulk of the Leitch targets were looking 
unattainable even before the impact of the recession (House of Commons Innovation, 
Universities, Science and Skills Committee, 2009b).  More broadly, we appear to be 
witnessing the terminal implosion of major elements of New Labour’s economic 
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policy, with the prime minister announcing that ‘laissez-faire has had its day’ (Watt & 
Wintour, 2009), whatever that might be taken to mean, and the emergence of fresh 
approaches to government intervention, and new models of economic development 
and business regulation policy, though the form and substance of such change remains 
profoundly unclear, probably even to those who are promoting it (see Mandelson, 
2008a, 2008b, 2009; DBERR, 2009). 
Given these developments, some cracks are starting to appear in the narrative.  
In a speech to the CBI, the Secretary of State for Innovation, Universities and Skills 
made the following observations in terms of the Leitch targets: 
The question though, that I want to ask today is whether all this will be 
enough. If we pursue these policies with sufficient determination, will 
they produce what our economy really needs: the right people, in the 
right place, and when they are needed? My answer has to be: ‘Not 
necessarily’.  There are a number of key factors driving our skills 
system, which are not yet properly addressed in our skills policies: 
1. Whether we understand properly what drives employer spending on skills 
and whether our current framework will maximise it. 
2. Whether a system that responds to the demands of individual employers 
will produce the critical mass of learners with the right skills. 
3. Whether government and business should not work more effectively 
together in areas of strategic skill needs. 
4. Whether national and local government themselves could not do more to 
boost the demand for, and supply of, skilled labour.  (Denham, 2008: 2, 
numbering added) 
As noted above, the narrative is a brittle one – it is hard to make major adjustments to 
any single element without running the risk of reducing the entire edifice to rubble. 
However, a great deal of time, energy, effort, political and reputational capital 
and emotional commitment has been invested in constructing the narrative, and it 
would be extremely unwise to assume that it will be easily abandoned by many of its 
architects and believers.  How hard such change would be is neatly illustrated by the 
words of Estelle Morris, an ex-Secretary of State for Education, who observed: 
So, the sheet set before ministers on their first day is  not a clean one.  
Often missing from policy announcements is a robust analysis of 
previous efforts.  What did the policies achieve?... Which should be 
continued and which dropped? Yet imagine the headlines if this were 
to happen: ‘Millions of pounds wasted’, ‘Minister undermines 
predecessor’, ‘School policies in turmoil’.  The need to evaluate 
interventions collides with the political imperative not to admit to 
mistakes.  (Morris, 2008: 3). 
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If this barrier applies to policies, how much more does it impact on the ability 
to admit that the fundamental analyses and explanatory narrative that has underpinned 
policy for the last two to three decades is fatally flawed? 
The road goes ever on……… 
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